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ABSTRACT
Individual citizens have been found to be a major source of 
new product and service innovations of value both to themselves and 
to the economy at large. These citizen innovators operate in a little-
understood legal environment that we call the innovation wetlands. 
We show via a review of fundamental rights guaranteed in the U.S. 
Constitution and elsewhere that individuals in the United States 
participating in the innovation wetlands possess strong legal 
protections with respect to both their freedom to innovate and their 
right to diffuse information about their innovations to others. 
However, we also show that legislation and regulation—often 
promulgated without awareness of consumer innovation as a 
valuable resource—can, in practice, significantly interfere with 
individuals’ exercise of their fundamental freedom to innovate. This 
interference can cost society dearly by discouraging and slowing 
innovation or even thwarting it entirely. Just as intellectual property 
may chill citizen user and open innovation by raising the costs of 
innovation, so may regulatory property rights agencies grant to 
incumbent market actors. 
We offer three approaches to protecting the valuable resource 
of innovation by individuals from excessive negative impacts caused 
by legislation and regulation. First, we propose enhancing general 
awareness of the issue by framing the concept of individual 
innovation rights as an “innovation wetlands” that must be 
protected from encroachment and despoilment. Second, we describe 
the legislative and regulatory frameworks and practices that demark 
today’s innovation wetlands, as experienced by individual and 
collaborating innovators. Third, we suggest improvements that can 
strengthen protection of the innovation wetlands, including 
heightening awareness of the issue in existing, mandated cost–
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benefit analyses that are already applied, although imperfectly, to 
regulation in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Many millions of individuals around the world spend many 
billions of dollars every year to create new products and services for 
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their own use. This innovation activity is of great benefit to the 
individuals involved, and to national economies as well. Individuals 
create products and services they personally need, and also learn 
from and enjoy engaging in the innovation process. Also known as 
user, consumer, or citizen innovation, this phenomenon involves 
individuals who, either alone or collaborating with others, engage in 
noncommercial innovation to satisfy their own needs. The practice of 
innovation by individuals prominently involves factors important to 
“human flourishing,” such as exercise of competence, meaningful 
engagement, and self-expression.1 In addition, the innovations 
individuals create often diffuse to peers, who gain value from them, 
to firms that may adopt them as the basis for valuable commercial 
products offered on the market, or to both.2 
Individuals innovate on their own and also collaboratively.3 To 
innovate on their own, individuals need the right both to develop and 
to use their innovations for themselves. To innovate collaboratively, 
individual developers also need the right to share their detailed 
designs with others, who then, in turn, must have the right to copy, 
test, and use these innovations, to add improvements, and to share 
with others what they have learned. Impediments to individual and 
collaborative innovation harm social welfare by reducing the 
amount, rate, and dissemination of innovation. 
The law robustly protects the rights of citizens to engage in 
noncommercial innovation and the dissemination of information 
about their innovations, both individually and collaboratively. In the 
United States, fundamental constitutional, statutory, and common 
law rights, such as the right of privacy, protect individuals’ rights to 
develop innovations for their own use without undue government 
interference. Furthermore, fundamental legal rights to share and 
disseminate innovation-related information, such as freedom of 
speech, foster the spread of innovations. What, then, are the threats 
to this valuable personal and societal resource? Most individuals 
cannot afford to spend a great deal of money on their innovation 
projects. Anything that raises their innovation costs can therefore 
have a major deterrent effect. As we will show, legislation and 
regulation at multiple governmental levels—generally aimed at goals 
                                                     
 1. William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 
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unrelated to individual innovation—can and do sometimes increase 
individual innovation costs to prohibitive levels. A particularly 
potent impediment to user, open, and collaborative innovation 
involves agency regulation. Regulation can directly harm individual 
innovators by raising their costs of innovating. Regulation can also 
act in a manner analogous to government grants of intellectual 
property. Just as the threat of infringing existing patent and copyright 
protections can chill subsequent innovation, especially where cost-
sensitive individual innovators are targeted, agency regulation can 
chill innovation by effectively granting to market incumbents 
powerful “regulatory property” rights. Large commercial firms are 
more likely to be able to afford substantial regulatory compliance 
costs. In fact, these firms may even lobby governments to increase 
regulation to increase barriers to market entry to prospective new 
market entrants. Even if not primarily aimed at individual innovators, 
regulatory property, like intellectual property, can have very harmful 
effects on the innovation wetlands. In effect, heedless government 
actions currently have significant impacts upon the fragile innovation 
wetlands environment within which individual innovators operate. 
In this Article, we will argue that it is important for society 
better to protect the innovation wetlands. We think this can be done 
with greater awareness of existing legal protections for innovation 
coupled with more careful and innovation-conscious regulatory 
design. At least in the United States, a mechanism is already in place 
at the federal level that can be used to insist on such awareness: cost–
benefit analyses are required for all federal regulations, and the 
requirements specifically cite the impacts that regulation can have on 
innovation as an important motivation and caveat. Many U.S. states 
also have similar cost–benefit analysis requirements. 
We begin Part I by briefly developing our innovation wetlands 
metaphor. We then summarize the evidence for the great extent and 
value of innovation by individual users of consumer products and 
services in Part II. Next, in Part III, we explain how a bulwark of 
existing legal principles, some longstanding and fundamental, are 
already available, in the United States, to protect individuals’ rights 
both to innovate and to freely diffuse their innovations 
noncommercially. In Part IV, we then explore how governmental 
actions can impact users’ rights to innovate and diffuse their 
innovations. Finally, in Part V, we offer some practical guidelines to 
individual innovators regarding their innovation wetlands rights. We 
also suggest approaches for improving protection of the innovation 
wetlands, a goal we consider very important to social welfare. The 
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right to innovate should be recognized, respected, and protected to 
ensure that individuals and society enjoy more fully the myriad 
benefits of innovation. 
I. THE INNOVATION WETLANDS METAPHOR 
Until recently, marshy ecosystems were generally regarded as, 
at best, resources ripe for conversion into more beneficial uses. At 
worst, they were considered noxious sources of pestilence and 
disease, as exemplified by the disparaging phrase “malarial swamp.”4 
Accordingly, for many decades governments promoted the filling in 
or draining of wetlands “through a variety of legislative and policy 
instruments.”5 For instance, “the Watershed Protection and Flood 
Prevention Act (1954)6 directly and indirectly increased the drainage 
of wetlands near flood-control projects.”7 Perversely, “[t]ile and 
open-ditch drainage were considered conservation practices under 
the Agriculture Conservation Program . . . .”8 These and other 
misinformed “policies caused wetland losses averaging 550,000 
acres each year from the mid-1950’s to the mid-1970’s.”9 
Beginning in the 1950s, a paradigm shift in the biological 
understanding of wetland ecology drove the recognition that, far 
from being dangerous or waste areas, wetlands are actually among 
the most productive and diverse of ecosystems on earth, providing 
great benefits, such as vital habitat for biodiversity, flood control, 
and water purification. Diffusion of information on these benefits 
changed the perception of wetlands by citizens, and the posture of 
governments also gradually changed. “Noxious swamps” 
increasingly came to be viewed as “valuable wetlands.”10 Regulatory 
approaches underwent a remarkable volte-face, resulting in a new 
emphasis on protection, preservation, and even rehabilitation of 
                                                     
 4. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence 
Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 886 (1997). 
 5. THOMAS E. DAHL & GREGORY J. ALLORD, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
WATER SUPPLY PAPER NO. 2425, HISTORY OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS 
UNITED STATES 9 (1997), available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/ 
history.html. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 83-566, 68 Stat. 666 (1954). 
 7. DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 5, at 9. 
 8. Id. at 10. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Harold Ornes & C. Michael Hogan, Wetland, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH 
(Sept. 30, 2014, 10:32 AM), available at http://www.eoearth.org/view/ 
article/157085/. 
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degraded wetlands. This new legal approach was crystallized in the 
U.S. Clean Water Act of 1972, which provided a strong legal basis 
for discouraging further elimination or degradation of wetlands.11 
The Ramsar Convention on the Conservation of Wetlands of 
International Importance also elevated the value of wetlands at the 
international level when it came into force in 1975.12 Whereas 
governments had once targeted wetlands for destruction, many now 
focus on preserving and fostering them.13 
We define the innovation wetlands as the rights and conditions 
that enable innovation by individuals to flourish. Just as in the case 
of environmental wetlands, the nature and extent of the innovation 
wetlands must be understood, and the value of the considerable 
innovation activity that takes place therein must be better 
appreciated. Recall that innovation by individuals, although of 
proven economic and social value, is fragile in the sense that it is 
developed by individuals who generally have small resources, and 
who expect only small-scale personal rewards for their efforts. 
Legislative bodies and governmental agencies whose legal 
actions raise consumer innovation costs can greatly damage this 
economically important and individually-valued activity. In fact, for 
many individuals, the mere worry that their innovative activities 
might trigger governmental (e.g., agency) scrutiny or penalties is 
sufficient to chill, or even end, those activities. For citizen 
innovators, actually being subject to an enforcement action can be 
financially ruinous, whether such enforcement is justified or not, and 
even if the citizen innovator targeted by enforcement ultimately 
prevails. This stems from a fundamental imbalance: individuals’ 
monetary, legal, and temporal resources are almost invariably 
insignificant compared to those effectively infinite resources 
available to governments and their regulatory agencies. By contrast, 
this imbalance is less pertinent to commercial firms, which often 
have access to the money, attorneys, and personnel sufficient to 
weather governmental action. It is important that present and 
potential negative impacts imposed by governmental legislative and 
regulatory actions be recognized and understood in the larger context 
                                                     
 11. Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012)). 
 12. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat, Aug. 21, 1975, 996 U.N.T.S. 245.  
 13. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AMERICA’S WETLANDS: OUR VITAL LINK 
BETWEEN LAND AND WATER 1-2 (2003), available at http://water.epa.gov/ 
type/wetlands/upload/2003_07_01_wetlands_vital_wetlands.pdf.  
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of an innovation wetlands to ensure better stewardship of important 
sources of innovation. 
II. INNOVATION DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFUSION BY INDIVIDUALS 
In order to understand the value that protection of the 
innovation wetlands can potentially provide, we must understand the 
nature and value of innovations developed by individuals. Many 
consumers develop product and service innovations for their own 
use. Such innovations can range from new or modified vehicles they 
wish to use, to medical innovations intended to address their own 
health issues, to software code that improves data exchange, to 
sporting innovations developed to use in sporting activities in which 
they personally engage. 
The large scale and scope of activities among individual users 
to create and improve products for their own use has been 
documented to date by three national surveys of representative 
samples of citizens over age eighteen. With respect to scale, as can 
be seen in Table 1, these surveys found that millions of individuals in 
the UK, the United States, and Japan individually spend between 
$1,000 and $2,000 per year in time and money developing new 
consumer products for their own use.14 Collectively, they spend 
billions of dollars annually on this type of innovation. In aggregate, 
the scale of this development activity by individuals rivals the scale 
of product development by all consumer product firms in those three 
countries.15 
 
  
                                                     
 14. Unless otherwise specified, all monetary values referred to in this 
Article are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
 15. Eric von Hippel, Susumu Ogawa & Jeroen P.J. De Jong, The Age of the 
Consumer-Innovator, 53 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 26, 28 (2011); Susumu Ogawa & 
Kritinee Pongtanalert, Visualizing Invisible Innovation Continent: Evidence from 
Global Consumer Innovation Surveys 3, 8-9 (June 30, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1876186; Eric von Hippel, Jeroen 
P.J. de Jong & Stephen Flowers, Comparing Business and Household Sector 
Innovation in Consumer Products: Findings from a Representative Survey in the 
United Kingdom, 58 Mgmt. Sci., Sept. 2012, at 1669, 1675. All figures have been 
converted into U.S. dollars for comparison. 
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Table 1: Extent of Innovation by Consumers in Three 
Countries 
 
 UK USA Japan 
Sample Size 1,173 1,992 2,000 
Percentage of population aged 
eighteen and over that creates or 
modifies products for their own 
use 
6.1% 5.2% 3.7% 
Annual expenditures by average 
individual consumer innovator 
(time plus out-of-pocket money 
per year) 
$1,801 $1,725 $1,479 
Estimated total expenditures by 
consumer innovators on 
consumer products per year 
$5.2 
billion 
$20.2 
billion 
$5.8 
billion 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the subject matter of user 
innovations documented in these three surveys covers a very wide 
scope, mirroring the wide range of product types used by consumers. 
 
Table 2: Types of Innovation Developed by Users 
 
Categories Japan USA UK 
Craft and shop tools 8.4% 12.3% 23.0% 
Sports and hobby 7.2% 14.9% 20.0% 
Dwelling-related 45.8% 25.4% 16.0% 
Gardening-related 6.0% 4.4% 11.0% 
Child-related 6.0% 6.1% 10.0% 
Vehicle-related 9.6% 7.0% 8.0% 
Pet-related 2.4% 7.0% 3.0% 
Medical 2.4% 7.9% 2.0% 
 
Individuals will innovate if and as their expected benefits 
exceed their expected costs, up to the level of resources they have 
available. It is reasonable that the average innovating individual will 
expect benefits per project that are, although a matter of personal 
importance, of relatively small scale. One consequence is that 
regulatory costs and risks that are easily borne by commercial firms, 
for which innovation-related regulations are generally designed, can 
be prohibitively costly for individual users. For example, a 
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requirement to crash-test an automobile enhanced by a modification 
before receiving regulatory approval to use an auto having that 
modification on public roads would be an acceptable business 
expense for an automobile producing firm—but would be literally 
prohibitive for all but a tiny, wealthy minority of car modifiers. Or, 
putting it in terms of the metaphor used in this Article, the innovation 
wetlands can be expected to be quite fragile: legislative or regulatory 
actions that increase the costs of individual user innovators can be 
expected to have a significant negative impact on the amount of 
innovation activity taking place. Overregulation drains vitality from 
the innovation wetlands, depriving society of valuable benefits. 
III. LEGAL RIGHTS TO INNOVATE AND DIFFUSE INFORMATION 
Individual innovators in the United States have strong, and 
sometimes even fundamental, legal rights to innovate, to use what 
they create for themselves, and to diffuse information to others about 
what they have done. These rights are de jure, or formally derived 
from the law, and are distinct from de facto factors, such as the 
practical difficulty of regulating innovative activities by individuals 
that are likely to escape detection, or are so common or popular with 
the public as to render enforcement impractical or impolitic. Though 
underappreciated and often unrecognized, these “innovation rights” 
offer robust protection to the innovation wetlands. In this Part, we 
explore the sources of individuals’ broad rights to engage in 
innovation-related activities without unreasonable governmental 
interference. As we will see, these rights often have long been 
embedded in the common law, the U.S. Constitution, or both. We 
focus on common law and constitutional innovation rights because of 
the powerful and durable principles they represent. Although 
legislatures and agencies can also confer valuable innovation rights 
by statute and regulation, respectively, these rights tend to be less 
reflective of deeper and more permanent innovation rights. 
A. Rights at Common Law 
The common law is a body of legal principles that has 
continuously evolved from customary practices and the decisions of 
courts. Having originated largely within the British legal system, the 
common law subsequently spread throughout the British Empire to 
countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and what 
became the United States. An influential early legal theorist, Sir 
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Edward Coke, emphasized the importance of the common law as 
“the most generall and ancient law of the realme,” and described its 
basis as “nothing else but reason . . . gotten by long study, 
observation, and experience.”16 Many common law principles 
support innovation rights and afford robust protection to the 
innovation wetlands. We highlight several notable principles, though 
there are many others. 
1. Bounded Liberty 
It is a fundamental default principle of U.S. law that, absent 
specified and legitimate prohibitions, people are generally free to act 
however they choose. This venerable liberty protects individuals 
from unreasonable limitations imposed upon them either by other 
people or by governments, and has deep roots in Western 
philosophy. As John Locke suggested more than three centuries ago: 
Freedom of people under government is to be under no restraint apart from 
standing rules to live by that are common to everyone in the society and 
made by the lawmaking power established in it. . . . Persons have a right 
or liberty to [(1)] follow their own will in all things that the law has not 
prohibited and [(2)] not be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, 
and arbitrary wills of others.17 
In the context of the United States, President Thomas Jefferson 
asserted that “rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our 
will, within the limits drawn around us by the equal rights of 
others.”18 More recently, philosopher Isaiah Berlin described 
“[p]olitical liberty [as] . . . simply the area within which a man can 
act unobstructed by others.”19 The law affords the innovation 
wetlands a generous zone of freedom within which individual 
innovation can both survive and thrive. 
This liberty is, however, subject to some limits. In general, one 
is free to take actions that do not materially harm others. Zechariah 
                                                     
 16. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 139, 171 (1623). 
 17. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT: A TRANSLATION INTO 
MODERN ENGLISH, at viii (Indus. Sys. Research 2013) (1690) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Issac H. Tiffany (Apr. 4, 1819), in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON POLITICAL WRITINGS 224, 224 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball 
eds., 2004). 
 19. Isaiah Berlin, Professor, Univ. of Oxford, Inaugural Lecture at the 
University of Oxford: Two Concepts of Liberty (Oct. 31, 1958), in FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY 118, 122 (1971). 
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Chafee offered a vivid and visceral metaphor to describe the limits of 
liberty to act, suggesting that “[the] right to swing your arms ends 
just where the other man’s nose begins.”20 This “bounded” liberty 
confers upon individuals a right to engage in innovation without 
requiring permission from other people or governments, provided 
that the actions engaged in while innovating do not violate specific, 
legitimate, and preexisting legal prohibitions (mala prohibita) or are 
not inherently wrongful or unreasonably dangerous to other people 
(mala in se). Beyond these limitations, individuals tend to be free to 
engage in a wide range of innovative activities. Indeed, the burden of 
proving that innovative activities do violate specific, existing legal 
prohibitions, or unreasonably endanger or harm others, generally lies 
with those who oppose these innovative activities. Furthermore, in 
the spirit of the rule of lenity, ambiguity as to whether an innovative 
activity is or is not illegal will tend to benefit an innovator wishing to 
engage in that activity.21 
2. Castle Doctrine  
Domiciles are accorded special protections under the common 
law. Their owners possess robust rights to deny entry to others, even 
official agents of the government. This principle is commonly 
expressed in the maxim “a man’s house is his castle.” This maxim is 
likely derived from a quote by biblical commentator Matthew Henry, 
who wrote that “[a] man’s house is his castle, and God’s law as well 
as man’s, sets a guard upon it; he that assaults it, it is at his peril.”22 
Later, in his influential treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, William Blackstone emphasized the strong justification 
that the law gives the owner of a domicile to keep others, including 
the government, from impinging upon that domicile: 
And the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the 
immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer 
it to be violated with impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of 
ancient Rome, as expressed in the words of [Marcus Tullius Cicero]; “quid 
enim sanctius, quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscujusque 
civium?” [what more sacred, what more strongly guarded by every holy 
                                                     
 20. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. 
REV. 932, 957 (1919). 
 21. Rule of Lenity Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/ 
rule-of-lenity/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
 22. 1 MATTHEW HENRY, AN EXPOSITION ON THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT, 
ch. 22, ¶ 6 (5th ed. 1761). 
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feeling, than a man’s own home?] For this reason no doors can in general 
be broken open to execute any civil process.23 
Exemplified by the iconic garage inventor, individuals quite 
often engage in innovation at home, where the law provides them 
with considerable protection from scrutiny, intrusion, and 
interference. Without well-founded grounds for invading this 
sanctum of the home, those lacking permission from an individual 
innovator can be legitimately excluded from invading the innovator’s 
home and property. The legal repose this affords robustly fosters and 
protects innovation by individuals within the innovation wetlands. 
3. Bodily Autonomy 
A corollary of Zechariah Chafee’s rule, that “[the] right to 
swing [my fist] ends just where the other man’s nose begins,”24 is 
that noses, and the rest of the bodies attached to them, possess legal 
protection from interference by others. This principle of bodily 
autonomy affords individual innovators considerable scope for 
innovation affecting only their own persons, most notably medical 
treatments involving medical procedures, drugs, or medical devices. 
Physical interference with the body of another person constitutes 
battery; even the mere threat of physical interference can constitute 
assault. Forcefully preventing an individual from engaging in an act 
of innovation generally constitutes an illegal invasion of bodily 
autonomy. However, unless the actions of an individual innovator 
unreasonably threaten or harm the safety of another person, that 
innovator may usually interfere with her own body, even if such 
interference is unwise or dangerous to that individual. Medical 
innovation involving one’s own body, such as the off-label use of 
pharmaceutical drugs to treat disease or discomfort, is generally 
protected by the principle of bodily autonomy. For example, medical 
patient contributors to the website of the firm PatientsLikeMe 
routinely engage in experimental medical treatments of their own 
maladies and report their findings on the firm website: 
www.patientslikeme.com.25 Not only do members of PatientsLikeMe 
innovate with respect to their own healthcare, they also often share 
their results on the organization’s website, allowing visitors to the 
                                                     
 23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223. 
 24. Chafee, supra note 20, at 957. 
 25. PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited Apr. 12, 
2015).  
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website to learn from the successes and failures of myriad others.26 
Although not without limits, legal protection for bodily autonomy 
allows individual innovators considerable liberty to innovate on their 
own health and bodies. 
B. Constitutional Rights 
In addition to rights arising within the common law, 
constitutional rights offer substantial protections to the innovation 
wetlands. We focus primarily on the highest U.S. legal authority, the 
U.S. Constitution, because most of the relevant innovation rights 
derive from the Bill of Rights, and thus apply to all levels of 
government by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Constitution provides individual innovators with several 
powerful and formal legal rights, including strong protections for 
thoughts, beliefs, and speech,27 and homes,28 as well as protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons and their 
property,29 and self-incrimination and compelled release of personal 
information.30 Together, these protections afford individual 
innovators with broad rights to conceive innovations, to engage in 
innovative activities in the privacy of their own homes, to use their 
innovations on and for themselves, to collaborate with other 
innovators, and to disseminate to others information about their 
innovations, all without unreasonable interference from 
governments. However, the Constitution is a two-edged sword 
because the copyright and patent protection it offers to authors and 
inventors can also discourage subsequent individual creation, 
experimentation, and tinkering, consequently inflicting harm on the 
innovation wetlands.31 
1. Right to Liberty 
In oft-cited language, the second paragraph of the 1776 United 
States Declaration of Independence recognized that all people 
possess “unalienable Rights [that include] Life, Liberty and the 
                                                     
 26. The First Amendment right to disseminate the results of one’s 
innovation is discussed further in Subsection II.B.3. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 28. Id. amend. III. 
 29. Id. amend. IV. 
 30. Id. amend. V. 
 31. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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pursuit of Happiness.”32 Later, the Bill of Rights enshrined a number 
of fundamental liberties, including freedom of thought, association, 
and movement.33 As the American Civil Liberties Union has 
suggested, the Bill of Rights “guarantees individuals the right to 
personal autonomy, which means that a person’s decisions regarding 
his or her personal life are none of the government’s business.”34 
Like the common law principles of bounded liberty, castle doctrine, 
and bodily autonomy, the constitutional right to liberty provides 
considerable legal protection to individual innovators by preventing 
governments, including their regulatory agencies, from arbitrarily 
interfering with, or prohibiting, the activities of individual 
innovators. In addition, individuals have strong rights to associate 
with other individuals with whom they may engage in collaborative 
innovation. In other words, the constitutional right to liberty provides 
individual innovators several robust default rights to innovate, both 
alone and collaboratively. 
2. Right to Privacy 
Consider that the right to be left alone is a fundamental 
precondition of liberty. Although this right is not absolute, and, 
indeed, is limited in myriad ways by both law and the necessities of 
social interaction, its inner core allows an intimate zone of privacy 
surrounding each individual that can only be legitimately invaded, 
either by other individuals or governments, in rare and well-justified 
circumstances. In his classic 1879 textbook on tort law, Judge 
Thomas Cooley provided an early description of a right of personal 
autonomy: “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of 
complete immunity: to be let alone.”35 However, it was Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis who formally proposed the existence of 
a constitutional right to privacy in an influential article they 
published in the Harvard Law Review.36 In its landmark decision Roe 
v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted that it “has recognized 
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that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy, does exist . . . in the concept of liberty guaranteed 
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”37 In addition, 
state courts have recognized privacy as a fundamental legal right.38 
The right to privacy is a highly valuable innovation right, 
providing formidable protection against government intrusion into 
even illegal innovative behavior. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia, 
the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy even shields an 
individual who possesses pornographic materials so obscene that 
they would be completely illegal for vendors to sell.39 In Ravin v. 
State, the Alaska Supreme Court went even further, ruling that the 
Alaskan Constitution confers upon individuals a right to privacy so 
powerful that it allows the personal possession and use of small 
quantities of illegal marijuana.40 More recently, after overturning a 
statute criminalizing same-sex sexual intercourse in Lawrence v. 
Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that “‘[i]t is a promise of 
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter.’”41 The right to privacy provides 
individuals with substantial autonomy of choice, including the ability 
to decide whether or not to perform controversial acts or undergo 
novel experiences, as well as the ability to control access to 
information about their private lives. It encourages individual 
innovators to take chances, question assumptions, challenge 
prevailing mores, and push back intellectual frontiers. 
This right to privacy is vital for fostering individual innovation. 
It affords individuals a zone of freedom inside which they may 
engage in activities largely beyond the scrutiny and interference of 
others—especially governments. This is important for at least two 
reasons. Individual innovators may experiment, tinker, and create 
without feeling constrained by worries that their activities or ideas 
might be considered by others to be unorthodox, foolish, unethical, 
or immoral. An innovator may also use her inventions to satisfy her 
own needs, especially if such use takes place in a location, such as a 
home, in which she has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Decisions regarding one’s body and health can illustrate how 
the right to privacy can foster individual innovation. This category of 
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decisions occupies the core of the right to privacy.42 Individuals are 
generally permitted to accept or reject medical care from 
physicians.43 Alternatively, they may choose to engage in medical 
treatment of themselves. In fact, they may decide to modify aspects 
of their own bodies, either benignly, in the case of tattoos or ear 
piercings, or negatively, as in the case of dangerously extreme 
dieting or bodybuilding.44 User creation or modification of medical 
treatments may, in some cases, turn out to be dangerous, but such 
practices can also lead to new insights into human health or even 
successful new medical treatments.45 As long as one avoids carrying 
out such practices on other people (which may, among other 
violations, violate state law prohibiting the unlicensed practice of 
medicine, or even constitute battery), this behavior is generally 
legally permissible, as long as it does not reach a level so extreme as 
to attract the scrutiny of mental health authorities. Even the most 
extreme act of personal autonomy—suicide—is illegal at neither the 
state nor the federal level. 
Naturally, innovators must usually still obey specific, 
legitimate legal rules, such as criminal prohibitions against 
possession or production of controlled narcotic drugs or dangerously 
radioactive substances. However, they are otherwise free to act for 
themselves as they wish, providing they do not harm others. Even 
actions ancillary to innovation, such as purchasing required parts or 
equipment, are accorded considerable protection under the right to 
privacy (and liberty), though the level of protection for an activity 
does tend to decline the further that activity strays outside a location 
or context usually associated with privacy. For example, innovative 
activities conducted inside one’s own home are more strongly 
protected by the right to privacy than are activities conducted in a 
public park. 
Finally, the right to privacy may even shield individuals 
somewhat from liability for infringing the intellectual property rights 
of others to the extent there is significant governmental involvement. 
Like the protection it affords personal possession and use of an 
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illegal drug in Alaska,46 the right to privacy might be invoked to 
challenge allegations of infringement arising from the personal 
making or using of others’ patented inventions in contexts redolent 
of privacy. Moreover, individual noncommercial use of patented 
inventions rarely results in litigation due to limited prospects for 
collecting damages.47 
3. First Amendment Rights to Free Speech, Press, and 
Association 
Crucial to individuals’ rights to diffuse information about an 
innovation through speech or publications, and to collaborate on 
innovation, are rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. This provision states, in relevant part, that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,”48 which, 
through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, also prohibits 
State governments from creating similar laws.49 
First Amendment rights robustly limit the ability of 
governments to restrain speech, communication, and the sharing of 
thoughts, thus allowing innovators not only to conceive of new 
inventions, but also to broadcast or share information about their new 
inventions with others, either directly or through general publication. 
These rights also allow innovators to meet and collaborate with one 
another. 
Individual rights to diffuse information tend to be robust even 
when they protect behavior with potentially harmful consequences. 
For example, in Caronia v. United States, a 2012 decision by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that a salesperson 
who promoted unapproved off-label—yet scientifically justified—
uses of a drug (in this case, the anti-narcolepsy drug Xyrem®) could 
not be held liable for violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
(FDCA) because the particular FDCA restrictions imposed on such 
speech—even commercial speech, which the Constitution tends to 
accord lesser protection50—violated the First Amendment.51 If such 
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commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, then a 
fortiori is similar noncommercial speech about the off-label or 
unapproved use of drugs and medical devices. 
The rights conferred upon individual innovators by the First 
Amendment should act as powerful protections against government 
actions that attempt to abridge the innovation process, from 
conception to publication to collaboration. 
4. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution can also be a 
powerful counterweight against governmental interference with 
individual innovation. It states that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.52 
Although usually associated with criminal prosecutions, the 
rights this constitutional provision protects complement both the 
common law castle doctrine and the right to privacy by acting as 
legal bulwarks protecting individual innovators from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion into their homes, writings, and personal 
property. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment 
as granting considerable protection from governmental intrusion into 
individuals’ homes, home lives, and possessions. For example, in 
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned a homeowner’s 
criminal conviction for growing marijuana at home on the grounds 
that the Fourth Amendment protected the homeowner from the 
warrantless use by the government of a thermal imaging device to 
detect heat radiation emanating from the home grow-op.53 Although 
most citizen innovation is benign and uncontroversial, the Fourth 
Amendment provides innovators, even when engaged in activities 
society considers unsavory or the law otherwise prohibits, with 
considerable protection at home even from government monitoring 
carried out at a distance. Along with castle doctrine and the right to 
privacy, this provides individual innovators with considerable repose 
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when innovating at home. It also makes the home an ideal place to 
innovate undisturbed. 
5. Rights Reserved to the People 
Finally, we note that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution not only allocate governmental power between the 
federal and state governments, but also retain and reserve all powers 
not specifically granted to these two levels of government by and for 
“the people.”54 The legal implications for the innovation wetlands are 
profound. No government can claim a right to legislate or regulate 
unless it can ground its power to do so in the law. In the absence of 
such a specific legal grant, the people are sovereign, and their liberty 
to act, and to innovate, is considerable. 
What does this mean for the innovation wetlands? 
Governments can legitimately legislate and regulate in many fields 
of human endeavor. Notable among these fields at the federal level 
are commerce, national defense, foreign relations, patent and 
copyright, and general police powers to maintain public safety.55 
However, the activities of individuals, when they fail to implicate 
interests legitimately within governmental jurisdiction, are largely 
beyond the remit of government. This is especially true of innovation 
that is noncommercial in nature, carried out by individuals on 
themselves or for their own benefit, conducted on private property or 
in one’s home, of a nature that does not materially risk public safety, 
or whose details are shared with others either privately or publicly. 
Much of the innovation carried out by individual citizens, 
independently or collaboratively, within the innovation wetlands 
falls into this realm of powers reserved to the people. 
IV. HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN IMPACT THE INNOVATION WETLANDS 
Given the array of legal rights described in Part III, one might 
ask why individuals’ rights to innovate, to collaborate, and to diffuse 
information about what they have created are not secure. Again, 
recall Zechariah Chafee’s rule: “‘Your right to swing your arms ends 
just where the other man’s nose begins.’”56 As possible sources of 
harm to public or private interests may exist, related to the 
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development and use of innovations by individuals, a reasonable 
basis in law and policy exists to correspondingly constrain users’ 
liberty of action with respect to many potential innovations. In the 
United States, three major levels of government can play roles in 
protecting or damaging the innovation wetlands: federal, state, and 
local. Each can constrain consumer freedoms to innovate via statutes 
or regulations intended to promote or protect public safety, welfare, 
or property rights, among other motivations, to benefit the public 
interest. In addition, governments, or their agents, may sometimes 
act due to improper or harmful motivations, such as agency capture 
whereby corporate interests influence agencies to regulate on behalf 
of protecting those corporate interests over the interests of the 
public.57 While the examples we use to illustrate the effects of 
legislation and regulation on the innovation wetlands predominantly 
involve the federal level of government, we use this focus for 
simplicity. Legislation and regulation by state and local governments 
(which may conceptually be subsumed within the state level because 
local governments tend to derive their legal authority from their 
states) can also have strong effects on the innovation wetlands, and 
we also provide some examples drawn from these levels. 
A. Regulating Access to Public Resources 
Consider that federal, state, and local governments regulate and 
control access to many public resources. This can importantly affect 
the innovation wetlands because, more often than one might suppose, 
development and practice of innovations requires use of public 
resources. Thus, one can build almost any type of car one likes, but 
to test or use it on a public road, one needs to meet detailed 
regulatory constraints intended to protect the safety of the driver and 
others. Similarly, one can build a radio-controlled unmanned aircraft, 
but to test or use it in the pubic airspace, one must adhere to detailed 
regulations promulgated and enforced by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). One can build a new wireless transmitter, but 
to test or use it in the public radio spectrum, one must adhere to 
regulations and constraints imposed by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). And, one can also use and test one’s innovations 
in public waters, but only in certain prescribed areas and under 
prescribed constraints, such as the avoidance of polluting effects. 
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Where others may be affected by an innovation, the argument for 
government regulation is stronger, but where the innovation affects 
only the innovator, this potential justification for regulatory action 
would be much slimmer. For example, in the case of an automotive 
innovation that a user makes and practices away from others—
driving the innovative auto only on his or her private land, and only 
at his or her own risk, for example—arguments favoring strong 
regulation to protect the public are much weaker. 
As we will consider in our discussion section (Part V), there 
can be ways both to protect the public and to provide access to 
public resources for user innovators. However, if legislators and 
regulators are not aware of the prevalence and value of user 
innovation, they can grievously and unnecessarily damage the 
innovation wetlands while pursuing other objectives. As an example, 
consider a pending European Union (EU) directive that will, if 
passed, in effect prohibit users from modifying their personal 
vehicles in functional ways, in the name of increasing road safety.58 
This proposed EU regulation, if enacted, will have just that result by 
mandating that cars will only be allowed on public roads if periodic 
inspections by authorized inspectors reveal that they have only 
standard producer parts installed, even if a nonstandard user 
modification enhances safety.59 
Road safety is certainly a worthy social goal, and as we have 
seen, governments have the right to regulate access to public 
resources, like roads, in order to reduce actual or potential public 
harm. However, no serious comparison of costs and benefits has 
been done in the case of this pending EU regulation because, we 
presume, there is no awareness among EU regulators that there is in 
fact a cost to offset against the intended benefit upon which they are 
focused. In the written background justification of this regulation, 
there is only one empirical study of automotive accident rates in 
standard and modified cars, and that study finds that modified cars 
are less frequently involved in accidents than nonmodified cars. 
The extent of economic disruption to individual user innovation 
caused by this single proposed EU regulation can be approximately 
measured by reference to the national surveys discussed earlier. 
Recall from Table 2 that 8% of all consumer innovations in the UK 
were related to vehicles. If we assume that each innovation in that 
sample had the same cost independent of subject matter, we see that 
                                                     
 58. Council Directive 2009/40, 2009 O.J. (L 141/12) (EC). 
 59. Id. art. 13.  
814 Michigan State Law Review  2015:793 
in the UK alone, consumer innovators spent $416 million dollars in 
vehicle-related innovations annually. Effectively all of this 
innovation expenditure and related benefits are threatened by this 
single short-sighted regulation. 
Regulations with damaging impacts on the innovation wetlands 
can be promulgated by all levels of government. For example, codes 
regarding acceptable homebuilding practices in the United States are 
generally left to state and local governments. Building codes that are 
drawn up without awareness of the potential of user innovation in 
this realm can prohibit novel—including safer or more efficient—
building techniques.60 Interestingly, unlike the auto-regulation case 
just described, where a new regulation threatens to close down a 
thriving and very visible ecosystem of vehicle-related innovations, 
opportunities for innovations that are deterred by regulations long in 
place can be effectively invisible because these innovations simply 
do not happen. This can make it difficult to document the benefits to 
be derived from the easing of those regulations. Phantom innovation 
prevented from ever occurring, due to misguided regulation, denies 
society considerable potential benefits. 
B. Regulating Commerce 
Federal regulatory agencies can generally regulate the 
commercial manufacture and practice of, and commercial advertising 
and distribution of, innovations via the Commerce Clause in Article 
1, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution.61 This clause grants Congress power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”62 The Supreme Court has 
construed the Commerce Clause as permitting Congress to pass 
statutes regulating broad swathes of the economy, and reaching 
commercial activity that implicates interstate commerce both directly 
and indirectly.63 However, Supreme Court decisions have 
consistently agreed that the Commerce Clause does not allow federal 
agencies to regulate truly noncommercial activities.64 The Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this principle in 2012, when it decided National 
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a case contesting the 
constitutionality of the federal Affordable Care Act of 2010.65 There, 
the Court clarified that “[t]he power to regulate commerce 
presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”66 
In other words, innovative activity by individuals that is 
commercial in nature can be within the legitimate reach of the 
federal government, whose authority to regulate is often derived 
from the Commerce Clause. In turn, federal regulatory agencies 
derive their legal authority to regulate commercial activity both from 
the Commerce Clause and, more particularly, from the “organic 
statutes” that govern their activities and specify the limits of their 
authority. Organic statutes typically limit agency authority to 
regulate more restrictively than the full scope of the Commerce 
Clause would allow. Thus, agency regulation tends to be best 
justified when it concerns clearly commercial activities. For 
example, individuals who develop and sell novel medical treatments 
are subject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory 
oversight. More specifically, when innovators or others begin to 
advertise or sell drugs or devices, or services entailing their use, the 
Commerce Clause is triggered, and the FDA, Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and other relevant agencies are empowered to 
regulate such behavior. 
However, as discussed above, when individuals develop their 
own medical drugs and treatments, they can personally make and use 
them as they see fit, provided that they do not use materials, such as 
opioids, specifically (and legitimately) proscribed by law, pose 
unreasonable harm to others, or infringe existing patent rights. These 
citizen innovators are also free to distribute information about their 
innovations, including design details and the effects of use they have 
experienced, to others without permission from, or constraint by, the 
FDA or the FTC, as long as they do not engage in commerce or 
incite others to break the law or infringe patents or copyrights 
belonging to others. In practice, innovative activity that avoids the 
indicia of commerciality (e.g., advertising, offering or holding for 
sale, or actually selling) lies at the margins of what tends to attract 
regulatory agency attention, and beyond what regulatory actions 
courts will tend to uphold as justified by the Commerce Clause or the 
agency’s organic statute. Individual innovators who innovate to 
satisfy their own individual needs, and who do so noncommercially, 
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will tend to be beyond legitimate federal agency regulation. This is 
the heart of the innovation wetlands. 
C. Defining and Regulating Intellectual Property Rights 
Patent and copyright laws are based in the U.S. Constitution. 
Article I, § 8, Paragraph 8 (the “Intellectual Property Clause”) states 
that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”67 Congress derives its authority to legislate patent and 
copyright policy directly from the Intellectual Property Clause, rather 
than via the Commerce Clause discussed in Section IV.B above. 
Consequently, with respect to patents and copyrights, Congress may 
regulate noncommercial behavior, such as that carried out by myriad 
individual user innovators. 
For example, without permission of the patent owner, one may 
not make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import a claimed invention, either 
directly or indirectly.68 This can pose dangers to the innovation 
wetlands, because even individual users who are not engaging in 
commerce are prohibited from making or using patented inventions, 
such as incorporating them into their designs. In fact, due to the 
unforgiving “strict liability” principles of patent law, even 
inadvertent or unknowing use of patented inventions may trigger 
infringement liability, monetary damages, and injunctive relief. This 
can create a forbidding cost and risk problem for individuals active 
in the innovation wetlands because it is often prohibitively expensive 
to identify all relevant patents and their true owners, to understand 
what activities all relevant patent claims prohibit, to calculate 
accurately the risks of infringement and litigation, and to predict the 
specific likely monetary and injunctive penalties. 
Copyright law also poses hazards to the innovation wetlands, 
especially in the restrictions it places on software code and the 
making of digital copies. Consider the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998 (DMCA).69 This U.S. legislation was intended to prevent 
free digital copying—“piracy”—of commercially sold information 
products such as software and music. However, the DMCA has 
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created severe collateral damage to users’ abilities to innovate with 
respect to products subject to DMCA restrictions, even where such 
products have been legally purchased. Specifically, the DMCA made 
it a crime to circumvent anti-piracy measures built into most 
commercial software. The intent of the law was to reduce “piracy” 
by using the threat of criminal sanctions to prevent copying of 
software or digital media. 
However, access to software code in products is also needed by 
user innovators to understand, modify, and improve products they 
purchase, and innovators must circumvent anti-piracy measures to 
gain access to the software code. As a result, the DMCA legislation 
raises the costs of this type of user innovation significantly, thereby 
damaging this portion of the innovation wetlands. The damage done 
is invisible—no one has totaled up the value of phantom innovative 
projects not embarked upon—but it may be of significant scale. 
Recall that in the UK, 14% of consumer innovation involved the 
development and modification of software. If, in the United States, 
the same fraction of innovation is devoted to software (this fraction 
was not measured in the U.S. survey), a total of $2.8 billion worth of 
annual of user innovation activity in the United States alone will 
have been put at some level of risk by the DMCA. 
In the legislative history of the U.S. bill, there is little evidence 
that the drafters were even aware of the damage the legislation they 
were developing would inflict on the innovation wetlands.70 And 
what evidence was presented failed to soften the draconian effect 
that the DMCA has had on curbing user innovation reliant on digital 
text, images, videos, recordings, and software code. Worst of all, 
uses of digital media by user innovators that were formerly sheltered 
under the venerable copyright fair use defense were walled off from 
user innovators by the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. 
Like a stream providing water to an ecological wetland that is 
dammed or diverted, access to the flow of digital resources that 
provides a feedstock to creativity within the innovation wetlands has 
been damaged by the DMCA legislation. Although some 
countervailing legal rights (e.g., castle doctrine, the right to privacy) 
may lessen the chilling impact that intellectual property rights may 
have on individual innovation, indiscriminate application of 
intellectual property rights to the activities of individual innovators 
risks doing substantial harm to the innovation wetlands. 
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V. DISCUSSION  
We have proposed that a first and very important step in the 
preservation and strengthening of the innovation wetlands is to frame 
that integrating concept and explain its value. In a similar way, the 
unifying concept of wetlands was used by environmentalists to draw 
together diverse features ranging from inland bogs to seacoast 
marshes under a single heading, so that their collective properties 
and value could be better evaluated and protected. Here, with the 
same goal in mind, we seek to draw together diverse innovation 
contexts, rights, statutes, and regulations, ranging from those 
applicable to the reverse engineering of software, the hacking of 
continuous glucose monitors to extend their capabilities, and 
experimental airplane design and usage, under the encompassing 
heading of the innovation wetlands. The important features that we 
view as common among all these diverse settings is the innovation 
activity of, and value provided by, individuals participating in the 
innovation wetlands, and the net levels of freedom or restriction that 
they encounter with respect to their ability to innovate freely and 
freely diffuse their innovations as they choose. In short, we believe 
the law affords individuals a robust right to innovate. 
Beyond this basic contribution, there are additional, more 
detailed considerations that we explore next. Analysis shows that 
economies that include open user innovation in addition to closed 
producer innovation improve social welfare.71 Therefore, if areas of 
governmental discrimination against the former type of innovation 
can be found, a “leveling of the playing field” or even positive 
support from government can be justifiable. 
A. Include Innovation Wetlands in Cost–Benefit Analyses 
The way to good practice with respect to innovation wetlands 
protections is, first, to measure the impacts of present or proposed 
governmental actions on the innovation wetlands. Such evidence-
based policy making has become a hallmark of modern regulatory 
analysis, and is often formally referred to as “regulatory impact 
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analysis.”72 This can be done by following the pattern pioneered by 
environmental protection acts around the world. “Environmental 
impact statements” are now required in the case of proposed changes 
that might inflict environmental damage.73 Within such an impact 
statement, evidence is provided to enable officials and citizens to 
weigh the likely costs and benefits the proposed change would create 
so that a rational, evidence-based decision can be made. 
Cost–benefit analysis has long played a role in regulation in the 
United States. It was first enshrined in statutory form in the Flood 
Control Act of 1939, which mandated a straightforward confirmation 
of net benefits: in any federal flood control project, the overall 
benefits were required to exceed the estimated costs of implementing 
the project.74 On a wider scale, the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (NEPA) introduced a requirement that cost–benefit 
analysis be conducted for any proposed federal regulation that 
implicated environmental quality. Although NEPA did not mandate 
that the results of a cost–benefit analysis be determinative on 
governmental decisions, actions carried out in the face of net costs 
naturally invite scrutiny. 
Perhaps the most far-reaching application of cost–benefit 
analysis has resulted from executive orders issued by presidents, 
beginning with Ronald Reagan. Over the past three decades, these 
executive orders, aimed at regulatory agencies, have markedly 
expanded the use of these analyses in evaluating the desirability of 
any new federal regulatory program. The Reagan administration was 
the first to make cost–benefit analysis a requirement for all federal 
regulatory agencies. On February 17, 1981, Reagan promulgated 
Executive Order 12,291,75 which mandated cost–benefit analysis 
when triggered by a variety of factors, most of them economic in 
nature. Among these triggers was any rule “likely to result in . . . 
[s]ignificant adverse effects on . . . innovation.”76 Succeeding 
presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush 
largely maintained this approach to detecting and minimizing 
adverse economic effects of federal regulation. Most recently, on 
January 18, 2011, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 
                                                     
 72. Regulatory Impact Analysis, OECD http://www.oecd.org/gov/ 
regulatory-policy/ria.htm (last visited June 14, 2015). 
 73. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 
§ 102(C)(i), 83 Stat. 852.  
 74. Pub. L. No. 76-396, 53 Stat. 1414. 
 75. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
 76. Id. at 127-28.  
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13,563, which reaffirmed Executive Order 12,866 (itself a 
reaffirmation of Executive Order 12,291), issued by President Bill 
Clinton, on September 30, 1993, and requires cost–benefit analysis 
of federal regulations.77 Among the requirements of Executive Order 
13,563, “[e]ach agency shall . . . seek to identify, as appropriate, 
means to achieve regulatory goals that are designed to promote 
innovation,”78 “each agency shall ensure the objectivity of any 
scientific and technological information and processes used to 
support the agency’s regulatory actions,”79 and the formerly 
prospective scope of cost–benefit analysis for regulations is to be 
made retrospective as well.80 A related procedure, called “regulatory 
impact assessment” or “regulatory impact analysis,” is required in 
many jurisdictions before passage of new regulations. Given growing 
recognition of the importance of user, open, and collaborative 
innovation, the addition of these forms of innovation to the cost–
benefit analysis calculus should help to shift the balance away from 
regulations harmful to the innovation wetlands. 
To recognize more formally the role it should play in sound 
policy making, some have suggested that the cost–benefit analysis 
approach for evaluating regulations be elevated into the more durable 
form of a generally applicable federal statute.81 So influential has this 
form of analysis become in federal regulation that the United States 
is sometimes referred to as the “cost–benefit state.”82 
One of the primary benefits of using cost–benefit analysis to 
protect the innovation wetlands is that it is already a requirement of 
federal law with strong bipartisan support. Rigorous application of 
such analyses to the federal regulatory scheme could help free all 
sources of innovation from unwarranted restrictions imposed by 
agencies. However, innovation by individual and collaborating users 
would benefit disproportionately. Because of the small scale of 
individual innovators’ resources relative to those commanded by 
firms, it is reasonable that increases in regulatory costs would affect 
                                                     
 77. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 78. Id. at 3,822. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. John D. Graham, The Myths of Benefit Cost Analysis, REGBLOG (June 6, 
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 82. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 1 (Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39, 1996), available at 
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innovation and diffusion activities of citizen innovators more 
severely. 
It is also the case that application of cost–benefit analysis to 
possible impacts on individual users is becoming more practical with 
measurements of the types and levels of user innovation activity that 
are now being carried out via representative national surveys such as 
those referred to earlier. These can, and should, be used as inputs to 
cost–benefit analyses. (Earlier, we illustrated this value in our Part 
IV case examples by roughly quantifying how much innovation 
wetlands activity was present in the two fields of motor vehicles and 
software.) Recognition of this new category of potential damage—
contributing to the cost side of the ledger—should tend to result in 
the approval or survival of fewer regulations harmful to the 
innovation wetlands. 
B. Design Regulations That Individuals Can Comply with at Very 
Low Costs 
Governmental actions appropriate to repair or offset specific 
damage to the innovation wetlands will to some extent be project 
specific. However, some promising general pathways can also be 
identified. 
One can add flexibility to currently rigid regulations to allow 
local adjustments that can open the door more widely to individual 
user innovation. For example, § 104.11 of the Utah building code 
provides county building inspectors with some flexibility in 
approving the use of unconventional, but innovative, building 
materials.83 Instead of being restricted to specified materials, 
inspectors may approve any material as long as they are satisfied that 
it meets the functional requirements of safety and reliability. Such a 
regulation has notable advantages. It allows for innovation in 
building materials, which may lead to improved materials, but it also 
maintains sound public policy by ensuring that these materials work 
as intended.84 Similar flexible treatment of individual innovators can 
be found in regulations applied to experimental airplanes and 
experimental vehicles.85 
                                                     
 83. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 156-56 (2008) (referencing INT’L BLDG. CODE 
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 84. Harris, supra note 60. 
 85. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 470 (2003). 
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As a second generic approach, agencies can elect to free 
segments of a public resource for unlicensed use and 
experimentation by innovation wetlanders. For example, the FCC 
reserves some segments of the radio spectrum as “white space[]” 
where individuals or groups can explore and exploit novel uses 
without having to obtain a license.86 At the same time, regulations 
reserve other parts of the spectrum for exclusive use by specific 
regulated entities with specified purposes, such as on-air TV station 
channels.87 As a second example, the FAA allows the use of some 
airspace—for example, space far from airports and up to a height of 
400 feet—for unlicensed use by hobbyist makers and users of small 
radio-controlled airplanes, including drones.88 Other altitudes and 
areas are reserved for the use of pilots of licensed aircraft, or are 
completely off-limits to use by any aircraft.89 
Finally, Congress possesses the discretion not to use its 
constitutional powers to support patent or copyright laws to intrude 
upon the innovation wetlands. It could amend the patent and 
copyright statutes to end liability for experimental, research, or 
noncommercial uses. Congress, the courts, and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) could even insist that no 
patent or copyright be granted or maintained unless it complied with 
the language of the Constitution that these rights be granted “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”90 Neither 
Congress, the courts, nor the USPTO have yet taken such steps. 
However, this would constitute good public policy for protecting the 
innovation wetlands and, if done judiciously, would have negligible 
effect on any current patent or copyright incentives to innovate.91 
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C. Improved Wetlands Affordances Beyond Regulation 
Beyond direct regulation, there are many business practices 
that are restrictive to citizen innovators because producers fear 
potential liability from serving these innovators. Innovation activities 
by individuals often build upon services, components, and equipment 
that are sold commercially. Costs for wetlanders are increased if 
businesses refuse to provide commercial materials or services to 
those they identify as wetlanders, due to fear of legal risks arising 
from their interaction with the innovation wetlands. For this reason, 
we suggest that laws should be changed to weaken users’ rights to 
sue producers for damages incurred as a result of user modification 
of producer products, services, or use of them in ways not intended 
by producers. 
It may also be valuable to consider the wisdom of freeing 
producers from legal liability if they support innovating users (which 
they may wish to do when users are working in areas of interest to 
the firm) without oversight or control of what users create. Ensuring 
a supply of products and services on or with which users may 
innovate also helps provide producers with user improvements that 
producers can then incorporate into better products or services they 
may then sell on the market. For example, boating firms interested in 
spurring innovation in boat hull design could then support individual 
or collaborating boating innovators with materials, tool kits, 
education, or even financial support without incurring legal risk. 
Such support for the innovation wetlands could result in a diversity 
of new and improved boat hull designs even if the supporting firm 
itself lacked its own internal research and design capability. 
Resulting innovations would benefit not only their creators, but 
would generally be disseminated freely to anyone, including the 
supporting firm, interested in using them. In many cases, supporting 
the innovation wetlands will tend be a less expensive and more 
efficient strategy for finding useful innovations than the traditional 
routes of relying on internal efforts or hiring outside consultants. We 
consider it a fair tradeoff to lesssen threats of liability to suppliers in 
return for improved access to tools, supplies, and services that spur 
activity in the innovation wetlands. 
                                                                                                                
Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REV. 55, available at 
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With respect to patents and copyrights, the fear of liability 
individuals currently feel should be eliminated by the pathway noted 
earlier.92 Congress should provide personal noncommercial use 
exemptions to make, use, and modify (and diffuse information 
regarding) innovation designs that are partially or fully covered by 
patents or copyrights. This could take the form of experimental, 
research, or fair use exemptions or defenses. This option exists in 
other countries, but not in the United States. The functional 
equivalent in the United States could perhaps be conveniently 
accomplished by incorporating a broad research exemption into 
existing U.S. patent law and by expanding the applicability of the 
fair use defense both for conventional copyright and for the 
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA. Ideal for the innovation 
wetlands would be an exemption for personal noncommercial use, 
which would eliminate the high burden, and resulting chill, of 
detecting and avoiding potential patent and copyright infringements 
for innovating users. 
Finally, governments offer extensive financial support to 
producers in the form of such things as research and development 
(R&D) grants and subsides, and R&D tax credits. Neutrality with 
respect to provision of public resources to support valuable 
innovation would suggest the devising of supports of appropriate 
value to wetlands innovators that reflect the considerable level of 
their contributions, freely given, to social welfare. These might take 
the form of government investments to support research in methods 
of open innovation collaboration and diffusion. Neutrality can also 
include support for the development of an infrastructure appropriate 
to cheap distributed innovation development and diffusion. 
Government subsidies have already played an important role in 
Internet development, and policy has ensured that the Internet is 
open to those who seek to use it for innovation-related 
communications. This has greatly widened the range of online 
innovation opportunities for which innovation development and 
innovation diffusion in the innovation wetlands is viable.93 
Generalizing such support to include activities that occur within the 
innovation wetlands would help to even the playing field between 
firm and individual innovators. More, better, and more affordable 
innovation would be the socially beneficial result. 
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D. Practical Guidance for Individual Innovators 
The essence of our message for individual innovators seeking 
guidance regarding their legal rights to innovate is that, as a general 
statement, individuals’ rights to innovate are generous and already 
deeply enshrined in the law. In the United States, protected by both 
constitutional and common law rights, individuals are free to engage 
in a broad range of noncommercial innovative activities to satisfy 
their own curiosity and needs. They may also innovate 
collaboratively with others, and then disseminate information about 
their innovations to anyone and everyone. Moreover, they may 
engage in innovative activities, both wise and unwise, and risk life 
and limb doing so. Strong legal limits on such activities are triggered 
when they pose unreasonable risks to others, especially harm to third 
parties or their property. Thus, the core of the legal protections for 
the innovation wetlands allow individuals to innovate for their own 
noncommercial purposes without posing unreasonable risks to 
others. Both the theory and the empirical evidence we present above 
suggest that the lifeblood of the innovation wetlands is precisely this 
category of individual noncommercial innovation that does not 
unreasonably risk harm to others. As we have shown, misguided or 
misapplied statutes and regulations can impinge on the innovation 
wetlands, thereby impeding one of society’s most important sources 
of new innovation, but the right to innovate provides legal 
protections against these threats. We next provide several illustrative 
examples of innovative activities that are likely well protected at law. 
1. Individual Medical Experimentation 
Like the admonition “Physician, heal thyself,” almost everyone 
has, at some point in her life, engaged in innovative self-medication. 
Whether improvised bandages, splints, compresses, hangover 
concoctions, herbal remedies, folk cures for the common cold, or 
words of comfort with placebo effect spoken to a child who feels ill, 
people routinely engage in the practice of medicine on themselves. In 
most cases, the malady being treated is mild and temporary. 
However, many people also develop and implement novel treatments 
for more serious and chronic medical conditions when frustrated by 
the limitations, in effectiveness or access, of formal medical care. 
Many of these patient-developed innovations doubtless are of little 
value, or possibly even damaging. However, some are extremely 
valuable. Indeed, many medically important treatments, now adopted 
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widely as standard medical practice, have arisen from 
experimentation by patients themselves.94 A powerful example 
involves NightScout, a community of collaborating individual 
innovators who successfully modified a commercially-available 
continuous glucose monitoring device—a device upon which many 
patients with type-1 diabetes rely to avoid such catastrophic 
outcomes as diabetic coma—to greatly improve the well-being of 
patients who require monitoring by extending the device’s 
capabilities to include remote monitoring of patients’ glucose by 
friends, family, or physicians.95  
As long as controlled substances or devices are not used, and 
others are not unreasonably endangered, the law provides strong 
protection to individual patient innovators to carry out medical 
treatments or experiments on themselves, to report the results to 
others, and to engage in collaborative innovation and 
experimentation. The FDA may chafe at such activities, and attempt 
to regulate them, but it is largely beyond the agency’s legal authority 
to prevent individual patients from engaging in such noncommercial 
medical treatment on themselves. 
2. Vehicle Customization 
Automobiles are legally regulated in many respects. These 
include minimum fuel efficiency standards, mandatory seatbelts, 
airbags, and other safety equipment, pollution emission standards, 
and wheelbase and width limits. Drivers must adhere to a plethora of 
operation regulations, such as not exceeding speed limits, obeying 
traffic lights and signs, and signaling turns and lane changes. Despite 
this maze of regulations, individuals retain tremendous scope for 
innovation, whether by modifying or constructing cars or by using 
them in unorthodox ways. High-fidelity stereos and video systems 
can be installed to transform automobiles into traveling 
entertainment centers, engines can be modified for high-performance 
or alternative fuels, shapes, colors, textures, and materials of various 
parts of a car may be customized, and many other creative alterations 
can be made. 
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Individual innovators can make a nearly infinite number of 
modifications to their cars while retaining their right to use public 
roads. In part, this results from a regulatory emphasis by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others on function rather 
than form. For example, as long as one’s automobile emits measured 
pollutants at less than a legally specified level, regulators will tend to 
tolerate many different designs capable of achieving lower 
emissions. 
On private land, customized automobiles are even freer. Private 
roads or race tracks can host even car designs that would violate 
statutes or regulations governing driving on public roads (e.g., 
monster trucks, drag-racing cars, demolition derby cars), provided, 
of course, that they do not pose unreasonable risks (e.g., extreme 
noise, noxious pollution) to third parties. Here, protections are 
afforded by such legal principles as the castle doctrine and the right 
to privacy. 
In general, individuals are fairly free to innovate on their own 
vehicles in the United States as long as any resulting innovations 
comply with safety and pollution regulations and do not pose 
unreasonable risks or harms to others. 
3. Intellectual Property Laws 
Individuals’ innovation wetland activities can be constrained 
by intellectual property rights owned by others. User innovators tend 
to be affected most by two kinds of intellectual property: patents and 
copyrights. Patents and copyrights pose a threat to the innovation 
wetlands that is different in kind from that posed by government 
legislation and agency regulation because ownership of these 
intellectual property rights tends to be diffusely spread among 
private owners. Rather than a small number of identifiable 
governmental threats, the threat of legal liability posed by tens of 
millions of patents and copyrights is decentralized among numerous 
private individual and corporate owners, making it difficult to 
determine whether or not one is infringing any of these owners’ 
intellectual property rights. 
One of the most worrisome aspects of patents and copyrights is 
the harsh legal standard of strict liability that can be applied to 
individuals who may, knowingly or unknowingly, violate owners’ 
rights. Strict liability applies as long as a defendant is responsible for 
an act that causes damage. Liability tends to be triggered based on 
whether or not infringement occurred, not whether reasonable 
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precautions were taken to avoid infringement or the infringement 
occurred intentionally. In the case of patents, there are currently no 
significant fair use, personal use, or noncommercial use defenses 
available to infringers. In the case of copyright infringement, 
infringer may invoke the fair use defense to escape liability for a 
narrow set of unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. However, the 
DMCA, through its anticircumvention provisions, has severely 
curtailed the fair use defense in the case of digital works, to the 
strong detriment of citizen innovation. 
Rather than the de jure protection afforded much activity 
within the innovation wetlands that may be threatened by 
government legislation and regulation, in the case of intellectual 
property law, wetlanders must generally satisfy themselves with the 
de facto protection that accompanies their de minimus and 
noncommercial activities. Especially in the case of patent-rights 
violations, patent holders whose rights individual innovators 
knowingly or unknowingly violate by making a copy of a patented 
invention for personal, noncommercial, or experimental use will tend 
to receive only damages reflecting economic losses resulting from 
infringement. Since this will likely be a very small amount, it will 
often be cost-ineffective for the patent-holder to sue individuals 
within the innovation wetland.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of awareness of, and attention to, the 
innovation wetlands that we have documented, evidence from 
surveys shows that innovation wetlanders are very active in many 
fields. In part, this is due to the reality that individual innovation 
tends to be small-scale and tends to avoid unwelcome attentions 
from firms and regulators who could have legal bases to take action 
against them if they so choose. This situation will become 
progressively less viable as the innovation wetlands continue to 
grow, and interactions with firms and governmental activities 
become progressively larger in scale and more visible. For these 
reasons, we must increase awareness of the innovation wetlands and 
their great value in order to ensure that statutes, regulations, and 
enforcement practices are better aligned to this increasingly 
important and beneficial phenomenon. Fortunately, the law already 
provides a robust right to innovate to individual or collaborating 
inventors, designers, creators, and tinkerers who inhabit the 
innovation wetlands. The core of this right protects noncommercial 
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innovation for personal use, collaboration with other similar 
innovators, and free dissemination to others of information about 
innovations that result from these activities. 
In this Article, we have focused upon the legal context for the 
innovation wetlands in the United States only. National surveys cited 
in our Article, however, indicate that new product and service 
development by individuals is significant in many nations, and so, 
appropriate governance measures should be examined quite broadly. 
Just as actual wetlands were despised until their ecological 
importance was recognized, and only then subject to strong 
protections and public support, the importance of the innovation 
wetlands needs both recognition and robust protection. Individuals 
and nations will only enjoy the full benefits innovation wetlands can 
provide once society and its laws consciously and zealously protect 
this invaluable source of innovation. 

